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Abstract 
In the recent literature on conflict resolution tends to underline negotiation model based on the 
argument or dialogue. Exchange between different styles of argument some trends have 
emerged in the rhetoric applied to the law, especially in procedural law. During the last decade 
researchers have recognized the value of the argument to understand various problems of 
jurisprudence in cases of conflict and strife. This paper proposes a complementary design to the 
analysis of the negotiation process based on debate and dialogue. It advocates a theory of 
argumentation in negotiation processes for instances where rational agents use strategies 
unpredictable with incomplete information.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent literature on conflict resolution has given importance to the role of models of 
argumentation. This attention is increasingly clear in various forms of negotiation that 
come from alternative forms of justice with incomplete information. For example, in the 
field of procedural law and the new mechanisms incorporated by the penal system, the 
argument is central as a method to argue cases for or against. That is, the renewal of 
legal rhetoric reflects institutional changes that have occurred in the field of 
Constitutional law, DC and AI Artificial Intelligence (Pereda, 1994; Prakken 1998). 
However, conflict resolution is not limited to describing patterns of argumentation, but 
also to understand what types of rational strategies have a business when looking for the 
answer to a conflict. Believing that the dialogue between opponents is a peaceful 
succession of good intentions is to limit key aspects of the process of conflict. Analyze 
the components irregular trading on the field argument we broaden the view of possible 
solutions to the conflict. 
  
We have one case in point, the growing distrust of the Justice and Peace with the 
paramilitaries in Colombia is related to the above premise. It is not enough to believe 
that the persuasion of the opponent depends on the coherence of the arguments that are 
presented (omit). Or that a conflict caused by a war of long duration, as in Colombia, 
with deaths, displacement and loss of land, is resolved with the good intentions of the 
criminal organizations. The mechanisms of memory retrieval, return of property, 
restitution, justice and peace, have a material causal quantifiable and a moral dimension 
that can be measurable. And in these cases, the mediation of the dialogue by way of the 
arguments is relatively effective, to the extent that balances the relationship between 
justice and fairness to the victims.  
 
The objections to previous failed talks have a relative weight. Appealing to the dialogue 
and argumentation in resolution of conflict is certainly a successful strategy (Perelman, 
1952, 1957, 1970, 1977, Walton 1998). The argument helps to show intentions (explicit 
or not), more than convincing, the argument can be used for a real chance to sit in front 
of opponent and face it with a rational language (Salazar-Castillo 2001). In summary, 
the arguments help to expose allegations publicly for or against a hypothesis which, 
incidentally, generated a social pedagogy for the debate in any society (Verheij, B., 
1996).  
 
During the last decade researchers recognize the importance of the theory of 
argumentation for the negotiated resolution of conflicts (Eemeren, FH van, 
Grootendorst., 2003) and describe how they can be used argumentation systems during 
a critical phase of the negotiated process. Indeed, assessing the damage factors or to 
state his reasons for his participation in massacres or crimes against humanity is to 
outsource the phenomenon led to public debate. Moreover, at present models of 
argument are deployed in less extreme cases of armed conflict at the local level, 
involving cases where alternative forms of justice to resolve intra-family disputes or in 
the local community. Yes, the theory of argumentation is defining new paths for the 
community to better understand the content of justice and law (Prakken, H., Sarto, 
1998). 
 The purpose in our case is try to respond to the contents of the following question: 
What role does the argument when we are facing a negotiator selfish? That is, the 
question suggests two components necessarily complex, while acting as a starting point 
the argument dialogue: (1) The criterion of rationality (2) The agent's selfish behavior. 
It should show how the arguments involved in the distinctive aspects of rationality and 
how their selfish interests‟ negotiators nuance in the argument. However, it is intended 
to cover all aspects of the negotiation based on the argument. What we hold is that the 
argument is also an exercise in strategic rationality (Schopenhauer, A., 1997). 
  
 
According to the strategic rationality solves agent conflict and silence say a few things 
other (Apostel, Leo, 1963, 1979). The arguments are used as tools within the type 
depending on the circumstances of the opponent, and when the process is proper to 
speak or remain silent (MacCloskey, Donald, 1987). And in these cases, it is proper to 
describe the formal content of the dialogue. Moreover, the dialogue represents one of 
the most recurrent of our rationality, he must study, discuss, analyze. In this case, the 
analysis of the dialogue makes sense within its own conception of the legal rhetoric 
(Atienza, 2004) For example, it is necessary that the opponent of the argument accept 
the premise of which derive meaningful conclusions. This rule is necessary and 
desirable for an adequate rational reconstruction of the agreements. However, failures of 
communication between negotiators from, usually, the aspects related to the interests 
that lie behind the arguments. In other words, the strategic mechanisms of the 
argumentation, in terms of the theory of speech acts (Searle, 1989), are phenomena of 
the communication process to comply with indirect speech acts. 
  
This article has the following aims. Initially, described the role of rational argument in 
the Dialogue, the logical rules that guide the reconstruction of arguments. Then he 
joined an illustration of the case applied an egotistical negotiator, to show limitations of 
a negotiation dialogue. In the last session outlines the relationship between the logical 
rules of Rationality in Dialogue RLRD. Then, we analyze the case referred to in the 
light of the maxims of Grice's Conversational MCG (1975). 
  
 
2. Rational argument  
 
The formal properties of an argument are closely related to the goals you have an 
argument to persuade his opponent given the conclusions from certain premises. Both 
the opponent and the arguments it accepts basic principles of reasoning. That is, the 
opponent of an argument can deny the same if you believe that the assumptions 
suggested by the rapporteur are false. But is it possible to reject a conclusion follows 
from premises that are well-defined? If the premises has presented an argument is valid, 
the opponent would be obliged to accept the findings. In the dialogue both parties can 
agree to accept platitudes. The second need: that the speaker can show how the 
conclusion follows from the premises in accordance with widely accepted rules of 
inference. The presumption here is that both parties, to begin the dialogue, they can add 
some rules of inference as valid or binding. In this case, the parties agree explicitly rules 
of propositional calculus and predicate logic with proven consistency. In another 
instance the arguments can adopt some rules of inductive inference as the basis of their 
approaches. 
  
There may be different formal models of dialogue rules depend on which participants 
are willing to accept as binding. But whatever the accepted standard of rationality in 
dialogue, formal rules should stay as a guarantee for the proper understanding. A logical 
rule states that if the opponent accepts the assumptions made by the arguer as likely to 
accept the conclusion. Strictly speaking, these rules can only govern a dialogue in which 
the parties accept the conditions of rationality and in which the different speech acts are 
guided by principles of logical inference. 
  
 
3. Rule RLRD  
This rule refers to a general principle of rationality that can be formulated as follows: as 
a speaker who takes the initiative with an argument and agree jointly with the opposing 
principles of sound reasoning. And since, moreover, that despite this, the opponent in 
the dialogue refuses to accept the conclusion of the premises expressing their 
disagreements. Can we claim in this case, negligence or weakness of the opponent? In a 
reasonable argument, the premises are preparatory background with which the arguer is 
able to persuade the opponent of the truth of its conclusions. In other words, it is 
logically impossible for an opponent to accept the premises of an argument, also refuses 
to accept its conclusions. A rational argument, however, can doubt or contradict the 
assumptions of the premises or the conclusion (Roth, AC, 2003). 
  
The starting point in the dialogue depends on the logical relationship between premises 
and conclusions are accepted by the arguer and the audience. Only then, can be 
established criteria of a dispute about the validity or otherwise of a particular argument. 
Under this condition, the rules of rational argument will depend on the acceptance of the 
premises, and a dialogue that is directed by these rules will then have a normative 
character.  
 
This rule can be stated as follows:  
 
RLRD When a speaker advocates a valid argument with premises P = (P1, P2, ... Pn) that are 
recognized in the conclusion C by the opponent, the opponent can move in another dialogue, 
accept or reject the conclusion C, refuting a the premises.  
 
 
This rule requires that the opponent into question one of the premises, if not willing to 
accept the conclusion, although generally satisfied that the argument is valid.  
 
RLRD is a central rule called the DPF type of dialogue (dialogue of persuasion flexible) 
in (Perelman, Ch Olbrechts Tyteca, 1952). Flexible persuasion dialogue contrasts with 
the rigorous persuasion dialogue (DPR), because it admits of degrees of tolerance in the 
movements carried out by the rapporteur and the opponent. When you can accept or 
reject assumptions that are controversial. In contrast, a rigorous persuasion dialogue is 
much more restrictive in this regard. According to the flexible persuasion dialogue, a 
rule would be: "If a speaker gives to accept all the premises proposed by his opponent's 
argument, ie, accepts the implicit relations between the premises and conclusions. Most 
likely, the argument is also willing to accept the conclusions of the argument of the 
opponent. The "implied assertion that connects the premises and the conclusion is a 
logical rule, regulation or structure of the inference that goes from premises to 
conclusion. For example, if the argument has the form of modus ponens, it is clear that 
the form is deductively valid, the parties to dialogue accepting the validity of modus 
ponens, are committed to accept the implicit aspects of this argument. In the dialogue 
analysis scheme presented in this perspective has obvious methodological advantages. 
 
4. Value judgments 
  
The practice does not always meet RLRD rational expectations. One reason for this is 
that in the dialogues a party can accept the premises and the argument is valid, and may 
even agree with the rules of composition of the argument, and nevertheless refuse to 
accept the conclusion. One reason for this reluctance may be because it has found an 
equal argument, which is opposed to the same conclusion. This situation, however, does 
not refute the original argument or some formal property found to be defective to the 
argument. We are in dispute are value judgments (Perelman 1959, 1977)  
In these cases, it is a dilemma, the choice of a conclusion that is not marked by personal 
prejudices. It is likely that the opponent does not refute or reject the formal structure of 
the argument, but wants to present his own version of events from premises equal, or on 
value judgments. In other words, the interpretation of the data corresponds to similar or 
parallel semantic domains. When what is being discussed with the opponent are events 
or facts on which moral actions are presumed. 
  
5. Is RLRD an alternative to conflict resolution? 
  
The warring parties have several options to face possible solutions. One option with 
very little imagination is to leave things as they were to begin. And in these cases, if the 
participants are genuinely interested in resolving differences, there are a variety of 
alternative mechanisms to respond to the crisis caused by the conflict. The four most 
prominent are: (a) negotiation (b) mediation (c) arbitration and (d) litigation.  
 
The arbitration and litigation are adversative rules in which a third party intervenes to 
decide. Mediation and negotiation are processes of consensus in which participants are 
proposed as a goal to do agreements on its own initiative or with the help of a third 
party called: mediator or facilitator. This third party including those affected, do not 
seek to impose arbitrary criteria. The role of facilitator met to make sure proper ways 
for negotiation. In our approach, we estimate the mechanism of negotiation / mediation, 
highlighting some critical aspects in the specific context of a negotiation. 
  
What Estrada (2001, 2005) called the principle of negotiation, relates an exchange 
within a persuasive dialogue process in which an arguer intends to get his hand to 
accept their conclusion based on rational argument, dialogue also designed , for the 
statements of the participants are true. Such cases are common. For example, a landlord 
and a developer are negotiating the price of a concrete slab to build a second plant. The 
dialogue would start arguing values of materials, payment of workers, time, and so on. 
The owner wants high quality materials, the builder review the increase in costs. The 
owner internet consultation materials prices, he realizes that the costs are relatively 
lower than those charged by the manufacturer. 
  
This type of argument of rational persuasion in which the conclusion leads to resolve 
dilemmas of regulatory and where the premises are used to prove that the conclusion 
follows from a given source of authority, are problematic. This means: what can happen 
in cases like this, is that questions arise about the premises asserted that much affect 
confidence in the conclusion. The premises that support the conclusion contain 
controversial reasons. In a dialogue whose purpose is to reach agreements by the 
existence of various conflicts of interest, general conditions have been discussed in 
RLRD, are necessary but not enough. 
 Sometimes these exchanges in persuasive negotiation may have fewer advantages than 
the quality and the original terms of a dialogue, whose goal is negotiation. In cases such 
as allegations in the custody of the children, the negotiations can be carried out in the 
midst of heated clashes between the parties, which may lead to practical dilemmas. If 
the mediator got a kind of discussion where the terms of trade become more impersonal 
and shown the importance of the dignity of the child, the discussion could come to have 
a tone better and less aggressive. Specifically, the reason is that the objective evidence 
is required to give to solving the problem. This is mainly to emphasize not so much the 
particular interests but what is more right. That is, ell change from negotiation toward a 
persuasive dialogue, in which it is possible to show true and false aspects, it is important 
to resolve negotiations at an early stage of dialogue. Moreover, this is the change of 
perspective that a mediator be encouraged.  
When you have a persuasive dialogue as an alternative to negotiating conflict, we can 
say that the principle has been applied RLRD. And in the interludes of this dialogue, the 
parties should be willing to listen to reason that promote greater clarity on the premises 
that best reinforces certain evidence. To make the agreements, it is important to be 
attentive to the first phase in which the parties are better equipped in such and such 
issues to respond. Thus, a degree of rationality has benefits for the arguments which 
may give the parties. This means, one of the hypotheses that can be sustained, is that the 
principle RLRD applicable as an alternative method for resolving conflicts at an early 
stage. In short, the prevailing literature on negotiations, the principle of rationality is 
more important than is recognized. A principle of rationality is crucial to discuss 
dilemmas of the conflict when things do not seem to go anywhere. 
 Obviously, the principle RLRD plays a role not always ideal, the parties may refuse to 
cooperate or be satisfied, each on his side. The restrictions that may arise to make sure 
arrangements are diverse. An argument can be any reason that they have adequate 
justification, as many as those presented also the opponent. Each party can discuss the 
rationality of their premises, reaching different conclusions. According to the concept of 
Kuhn (1972), the parties might be thought that run through the evidence from 
paradigms incommensurable.   
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